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Abstract
This paper investigates how CEO characteristics a¤ect rm value through divesti-
ture. Using a novel dataset tracking CEOs career path, from which CEOs talent and
expertise are reasonably inferred, I nd when CEOs have di¤ering abilities across divi-
sions of conglomerates, they more likely divest divisions that they are less qualied to
manage, and focus on divisions of better match with their talents and expertise. The
better match of their talents with rmsretained assets is the source of value creation
from refocusing divestiture. Divestitures that increase corporate focus but not improve
the talent-asset match do not create value in long run. The results are robust to con-
trolling various factors that may a¤ect rmsdivestiture decisions. This study adds
a new perspective to the growing literature that managerial characteristics matter for
corporate policy decisions and performance.
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1 Introduction
Managers have contrasting styles. Di¤erent managers may t well with a rm in di¤erent
phases of the rm. For example, on its choice of John N. Lemasters as the rms new CEO,
the board of Contel Corporation commented: His technical savvy sets him apart from other
Contel executives, most of whom are accountants by training. He is a hep guy technologically,
......a man who can manage the nal stage of transition.By contrast, Napier, the departing
CEO and President of Contel, had exclusively nancial strengths. Financial economists
have started recognizing and evaluating the potential inuence of idiosyncratic managerial
di¤erence on rm behavior and economic performance. In their seminal contribution to the
manager matters literature, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document manager xed e¤ects
are important determinants of a wide range of corporate decision making. Frank and Goyal
(2006) nd managers have a signicant impact on corporate leverage and manager xed
e¤ects largely wipe out the impact of rm xed e¤ects. There are other studies relating
observable managerial attributes with rm characteristics and performance1. Given that
managers do matter in corporate decisions, it is of particular interest to understand how
managers characteristics a¤ect rms investment decision and the consequent rm value,
which has received far less attention.
This paper investigates how CEO-rm match characterized by the matching of CEOs
expertise with rms assets shapes CEOs divestiture decision and impacts rms gain from
divestiture. I posit that CEOs in conglomerates divest for better match of their expertise
with rmsretained assets, and nd evidence in support. Job match theory pioneered by
Jovanovic (1979a, 1979b) suggests that seemingly equivalent managers vary in their produc-
tivities because of heterogeneity in the quality of job matches. Due to the complexity of
conglomerate operations in di¤erent industries, some CEOs may nd they are not equally
talented in managing all divisions of the rms. To maximize their productivities, they are
very likely motivated to divest divisions that they are less qualied to manage and focus on
divisions of better match with their expertise2. One primary objective of this paper is to
1For examples, see Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) and Li and Ueda (2005).
2One may argue that those CEOs can employ able divisional experts and delegate decisions in those divi-
sions to them. Nevertheless, the literature (for example, Rotemberg and Saloner (1994)) suggests it becomes
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ask whether the biggest gains from refocusing divestitures accrue to rms whose managers
divest divisions they were least qualied to manage, i.e. where the matching between ex-
pertise of divesting managers is the farthest from divested divisions. Allgood and Farrell
(2003) argue a good CEO-rm match is associated with good rm performance, suggesting
performance is the driving factor determining the CEO-rm match quality. Yet the matching
process remains a black box. Furthermore, as they point out, using performance as proxy for
CEO-rm match quality has to abstract from the fact that the match quality may change
as rm grows and industry/market conditions change. This study relaxes this constraint
and specically investigate how CEOs divestiture decision may facilitate favorable change
in CEO-rm match quality and thus create value.
My exploration of the match of CEOs expertise with rm assets is motivated by anecdotal
evidence3 that CEOs lack of industry expertise often determines rms exit in the industry.
For example, Robert D. Kennedy, then CEO of Union Carbide Corp, divested almost all busi-
ness in the companys Consumer and Industrial Products group (even though it was regarded
by analysts as the companys birthright and high-growth business). Kennedy had been the
President of and long responsible for the other group - Chemicals and Plastics before he took
over the company as its CEO in 1986. In his comment on the divestiture decision, he cited his
31-year career with the company in each of those retained business, which he felt had given
him a real understanding of and belief in those business4. Besides, investors have their
harder to incentize divisional managers in conglomerates relative to managers in stand-alone rms. Further,
delegating strategic decisions to divisional managers when CEOs have no business expertise may make mon-
itoring of the divisional managers less e¤ective and also may distract headquarters capital allocation from
its optimal level.
3As Bertrand and Schoar (2003) argue there is generally no role for idiosyncratic di¤erences across man-
agers in many empirical studies of corporate decisions and standard agency models, managers expertise
has been taken with such neoclassical view as well. Yet theres abundance of anecdotal evidence indicating
otherwise.
4Dun & Bradstreet provides another interesting case. The companys CEO Charles Moritz explained the
sale of Corinthian Broadcasting in 1984 as follows, There are some things we do pretty well, like these
information businesses, and there are other things we dont know how to do quite so well. We realized that
to manage a television group broadcaster to be number one in its markets would require some skills that, to
be brutally honest, were not so good at.For the same reason, the company sold Technical Publishing in
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concerns for CEOsexpertise as well. This is pictured by Wall Streets contrasting responses
on CEO appointment announcements depending on whether new CEOs have industry expe-
rience or not. For instances, Wall Street analyst expressed little optimism that the new chief
could turn around the struggling M/A-Com upon the companys announcement of electing
Thomas A. Vanderslice Chairman and CEO5: I think the jury is still out on whether it will
be good news......I would have preferred to see the job go to someone with greater experience
in defense electronics, given the trials and tribulations facing the defense industry.In con-
trast, industry analysts generally applauded the moves when American Cyanamid Company
named Albert J. Costello chairman and chief executive and Frank V. AtLee President. The
two top executives were seen as having complementary strengths Costello in agricultural
products and AtLee in the medical area, two core areas of the companys operations. As
such, CEOs industry expertise turn out as potentially important factors in determining her
qualication in managing rms assets and her divestiture decisions.
When CEOs have di¤ering abilities for managing rmsdivisions and divest those they
were less qualied to manage, divestitures can a¤ect rm value in the following ways. First,
their higher marginal productivity in managing retained divisions will create greater value
than if their e¤orts are split up between divested and retained divisions before divestitures. In
contrast, when CEOs are equally (un)capable in managing divisions (so that expertise-asset
match is unlikely a concern), divestitures result in corporate focus but CEOsidentical pro-
ductivities in retained divisions as in divested ones will not make the overall postdivestiture
value di¤erent from when their e¤orts are split up between divested and retained divisions.
Second, focus on divisions of better match with CEOsexpertise enables CEOs to convey
the value of their rms more credibly to the market. Their track record of success in the
retained divisions (or industries of the divisions) has branding e¤ect when they communicate
rmsstrategies to the investment community. Thus rms may incur lower cost in producing
and transmitting information, and shareholders can capitalize fair return on rms invest-
1986. Both divisions were still protable when D&B sold them. Moritz spent most of the 25 years in the
companys Donnelley marketing division before he became CEO of D&B in 1984.
5According to New York Times on Nov. 29, 1989, Mr. Vanderslice spent 23 years with the General Electric
Company, rising to be vice president and sector executive of power systems. At the end of the 1970s, he left
G.E. for the GTE Corporation and in 1984 he joined Apollo until it was acquired in early 1989.
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ments. This certication value6 is incremental to the value from reduction in information
asymmetry from corporate refocus. Other rms may become less obscure for investors due
to refocusing divestitures, but the unchanged matching quality between CEOstalents and
retained divisions will not add in the certication value7.
Thus, corporate divestiture provides an ideal environment for us to observe how man-
agerial characteristics like industry expertise a¤ect rms investment decisions and value.
Furthermore, while the literature agrees that on average greater corporate focus through di-
vestiture is consistent with shareholder value maximization8, less attention has been paid to
understand that to what extent and how corporate refocus creates value. Even a positive av-
erage e¤ect of refocus need not imply the absence of situations where refocusing divestitures
fail to create value. As we consider the cross-sectional variation in corporate refocus value
that remains largely unexplained, the signicance of CEOs expertise is further underlined
given their inuence on rms divestiture deicision.
My sample consists of all focus-increasing rms that divest at least one entire business
segment mostly through asset sales between 1980 and 2003. I hand-collect data that track
all divesting CEOsmanagerial experience throughtout their career paths, from which CEOs
talents and expertise in all divisions of the divesting rms can be reasonably inferred. Among
the total 486 rm-years, theres great heterogeneity in CEOs expertise within rms and
6This term is coined in Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) when they argue the quality and reputation of a
rms management can a¤ect its IPO pricing.
7The following statement led by Pirate Capital (one institutional investor of James River Coal) in a 13D
le is cited in Brav et al. (2006) and I think it is a good example of the certication value of CEOs expertise:
We have become increasingly concerned that James Rivers valuation is being discounted relative to its peers
- a discrepancy we attribute to managements failure to articulate to the investment community a cohesive
operational and nancial strategy, together its domenstrated inability to meet its earnings consensus...... We
attribute these missteps to CEO Peter Sochas lack of operating experience within the coal industry...... We
are now convinced that the companys senior management team is simply not up to the task of achieving
such goals......
8See, for examples, John and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995), Berger and Ofek (1999), Daley
et al. (1997), Desai and Jain (1999), and Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) among others.
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across rms. CEOs in 164 rm-years have di¤ering abilities in managing divisions of the
rms. They are referred to as specialist CEOs, and those divisions that specialist CEOs
have expertise managing are classied as specialized divisions, while those that specialist
CEOs do not specialize in are labeled unspecialized divisions. Divestitures by those specialist
CEOs who divest unspecialized divisions and retain specialized divisions are thus classied as
Divestiture for better match. I use all other divestitures by specialist CEOs and those by
CEOs in the other 322 rm-years as the benchmark in my analysis. Therefore, the empirical
analysis in the paper focuses on specialist CEOsdivestiture decisions to determine whether,
ceteris paribus, unspecialized divisions are more likely divested than specialized divisions,
and whether refocus gains accure to these divestitures by specialist CEOs for better match
of their talents with rmsretained divisions.
The empirical results are generally consistent with the divest-for-better-match hypoth-
esis. I nd that the majority of specialist CEOs divest unspecialized divisions and retain
specialized divisions. An unspecialized division is more likely divested than a specialized one
even after controlling various factors that may lead to a divisions divestiture. Moreover,
consistent with the literature that focus-increasing divestitures create value, on average sam-
ple rms experience signicant positive three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs).
But strikingly, the abnormal performance is only limited to rms divesting for better CEO-
rm match, while other rmsBHARs are not signicantly from zero. I further test the
robustness of the divest-for-better-match hypothesis by examining rmschanges in diver-
sication discount and operating performance through refocusing divestitures. I nd both
types of rms signicantly underperform their industry peers and experience diversication
discounts for the three years prior to divestitures. For the postdivestiture three-year period,
rms divesting for better CEO-rm match dont underperform their industry peers or ex-
perience diversication discount any more, while the poor performance and discount persist
for all other rms. Specically, rms divesting for better CEO-rm match have signicantly
greater improvement in protability and market valuation following divestitures. My results
show that ignoring the manager-rm match problem may overestimate the value e¤ect of
corporate refocus.
My results are not driven by the di¤erent degrees of change in focus, by rms that were
5
taken over following divestitures, or by rms that reverse their investment mistakes through
divesting prior poor acquisitions. I further undertake a variety of tests to ensure the results
are free from some confounding factors. In particular, di¤erences of rm characteristics are
not driving forces of the main results. For example, the main results are not driven by the fact
that rms with specialist CEOs are on average larger than other rms prior to divestitures.
My main results hold even when comparisons are made between rms with similar sizes.
I show further evidences that lend stronger support to the main hypothesis. Among rms
divesting for better match, I nd smaller rms gain more from divestitures than larger ones.
This is consistent with the fact that greater improvement in CEO-rm match quality through
divestiture takes place in smaller rms, and that leads to greater gains. Also, all divestiture
gains go to better-matched rms with divesting CEOs staying for long term to capitalize
on the better talent-asset match, while better-matched rms with divesting CEOs departing
shortly following divestitures do not gain at all. It further highlights the value implication of
CEO-rm match.
An alternative potential interpretation of specialist CEOs divestiture preference is the
entrenchment motive in the sense of Shleifer and Vishny (1989). Specialist CEO may focus
corporate resource on specialized divisions for her higher job security and lower human capital
risk. The prediction of this agency view, however, would lead to the opposite direction
to my empirical ndings on postdivestiture rm values. Another potential concern is the
endogeneity problem. CEO succession is not a random event9. Board may have determined
corporate focus strategy and then specically select a specialist CEO in anticipation that
her expertise will faciliate to implement this focus strategy. To address this issue, I presume
with legitimacy that if CEOs are strategically picked to implement boards predetermined
decisions, we should observe the new specialist CEO divests the unspecialized divisions soon
after the succession. Thus I repeat my analysis using a subsample of divesting rms, in
which all CEOs make the divestiture decisions at least after two years following successions10.
9Li (2005) specically examines the endogenous matching problem between rms and CEOs in a context
of CEO turnover, and nd rm post-turnover performance could be underestimated without taking into
consideration the matching problem.
10The median of the time wedge between CEO turnover and divestiture decision is two years for all rms
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The primary results hold. Together with the fact that more than half of CEOs categorized
as divesting-for-better-match undertake divestitures at least two years after successions, it
suggests that these CEOs do divest for better match with rmsassets instead of simply
following boardspredetermined strategies.
This paper adds a new perspective to the growing literature that individual managers
matter for corporate policies. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that the idiosyncratic char-
acteristics of managers have signicant inuence on rms investment policy, nancial policy
and organizational strategy. In a similar line with this paper, Xuan (2006) investigates how
new CEOsprior a¢ liations with rmsdivisions a¤ect their capital budgeting decisions. He
nds a reverse-favoritism pattern that divisions not previously a¢ liated with the new CEO
receive signicantly more capital expenditures in the following year of CEO turnover than
a¢ liated divisions. But he doesnt examine the value implication of this bridge-building
behaviour. Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) nd management quality and reputaion of the
entire management team, measured by proxies of general management skills, a¤ect rms IPO
and post-IPO performance. Sample rms in their study are those relatively younger, smaller
and stand-alone rms, which are systematically di¤erent from the older, larger and multi-
divisional conglomerates that Im examining. And they focus on the whole management
teams general management skills proxied by, for examples, business education and nancial,
legal and accounting knowledge. In this study, I strengthen the importance of CEOs indus-
try expertise given the diverse nature of conglomeration. Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and
Wolfenzon (2007) nd CEO own and family death are strongly correlated with declines in
rms operating protability, investment and sales growth. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) nds that
CEOs who are family descendants of a departing CEOs, a founder or a large shareholder of
the rm and did not attend selective colleges signicantly underperform relative to unrelated
CEOs. Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen (2007) assess entrepreneurial CEOs of buyout and
VC-funded companies in seven general areas - leadership, personal, intellectual, motivational,
interpersonal, technical and functional, and study how these CEO characteristics and abilities
relate to hiring decisions, private equity investment decisions and subsequent performance.
Closest to the spirit of this study, Gompers et al. (2007) relate venture capitalistsindustry
divesting for better CEO-rm match.
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experience with their investment decisions, and nd VCs with the most industry experience
respond to favorable product market signals most by increasing their investments most than
other VCs with relatively little industry experience and those with considerable experience
but in other industries. Instead of looking at managers, Guner, Malmendier and Tate (2007)
present a conict-of-interest view that nancial expertise of board members a¢ liated with
nancial institutions matters for corporate decisions in the interest of their own institutions.
My study is also related to prior work that documents the cross-sectional variation of
value gains from divestitures. An extensive stream of research focuses on the di¤erence
of value gains from focus-increasing divestitures and non-focus-increasing divestitures as I
introduced at the start. My paper extends the inuential view that focus increase creates
value, and examines when focus increase creates value. Besides those studies, Cusatis, Miles
and Woolridge (1993) investigate the value created through spino¤s and show that both the
spuno¤ subsidiaries and parents experience an unusually high incidence of takeovers and the
abnormal long-run return is limited to rms involved in takeover activitity. In this paper,
I control for postdivestiture takeover activitity and my main results are una¤ected. Lang,
Poulsen and Stulz (1995) propose and test an agency view of asset sales, and nd stock market
discounts asset sale proceeds retained by the divesting rm. But they dont look at the long-
run e¤ect on rms performance and value gain for shareholders. Bates (2005) examines
divesting rmsuse of proceeds and the trade-o¤ between investment e¢ ciencies and agency
costs of managerial discretion associated with retained proceeds. He nds that rms tend to
retain proceeds with favorable contemporaneous growth opportunities and higher expected
investment, and shareholder returns to retention decisions are positively related with growth
opportunities and net-of-industry investment.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data and presents sample and
variable construction. Section 3 examines specialist CEOs divestiture preference. Section
4 presents the main results on value gains from refocusing divestitures. Section 5 conducts
additional tests on rm performance and robustness checks. The paper concludes with Section
6.
8
2 Data and Variables
2.1 Sample Construction and Data Sources
The sample consists of all diversied rms which divest at least an entire business division. I
start by identifying all rms in Compustat segment tapes that report at least one less segment
between 1980 and 200311. To make sure the decrease in the number of reported segments is
not simply due to report changes, I investigate the asset sale and spino¤ activities by these
rms in SDC. In order to be qualied as a sample rm, one must be a diversied rm prior
to divestiture, operating in at least two di¤erent industries (3-digit SIC code). And then one
must have simultaneous divestiture record in SDC corresponding to the drop of the segment
that ceases reporting. The Wall Street Journal and wire reports in Lexis-Nexis are used to
conrm that the divestitures reported in SDC cause the segment in question to be dropped.
In addition, rms incorporated outside the United States are not considered. And those rms
that dont have Compustat and CRSP data available are also not qualied for the sample.
In the resulting sample, I nd 797 rm-years of divestitures that result in the reduction of
the number of reported segments. I remove 122 rm-years in that the divesting rms are
not classied as diversied as they virtually operate in single industries12. 29 rm-years are
dropped when a segment in nancial sector (with SIC between 6000 and 6999) or in utility
sector (with SIC between 4900 and 4999) is divested. 8 rm-years are further dropped when
divestiture is made after rm les bankruptcy or is in a process of liquidation.
For each of the 638 refocusing rm-years in the sample, I hand-collect information on
divesting CEOs career path and some other characteristics that are relevant to my analysis
from various media sources including company proxy statements, SEC lings, Lexis-Nexis
people search, Factiva news search, company websites and other internet resources. The
information collected includes CEO age, tenure, managerial responsibilities throughout the
corporate ranks and the durations, industry specializations, whether the divesting CEO was
appointed from inside or outside the rm, the nature of turnover both for the divesting CEO
and her predecessor, whether the divesting CEO is the founder of the rm and whether the
11My data ends in 2003 because I need to investigate three-year post-divestiture stock returns.
12The reported segments in those rms share the identical three-digit SIC code.
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rm is a family rm.
I further drop 72 rm-years where information on divesting CEOs career path is not
available. Since my analysis is primarily based on a three-year period following divestiture, I
remove 70 rm-years where divestiture decision is made by a CEO who steps down one year
or months following the divestiture13. Finally, 7 rm-years are dropped because divestiture
decision is made by an interim CEO and 3 rm-years are removed where the divesting CEO
moves to a spun-o¤ entity as CEO following a spino¤. The nal sample consists of 486
organizational changes (447 asset sales and 39 spino¤s) by 412 rms.
2.2 Variable Denition and Construction
2.2.1 Managerial Expertise and Specialist CEO
I measure CEOs expertise in divisions using CEOs managerial responsibility experience in
the divisions or the industries of the divisions prior to the appointment14. I classify CEOs as
specialist CEOs who specialize in managing certain, but not all, divisions of the rms. They
either advanced through the ranks from certain, but not all, divisions in their rms prior to
adding the title of CEO (mostly as divisional managers), or they have managerial experience
in certain, but not all, industries that rms operate in if they are hired from outside (used to
be managers in other rms of same industries)15. All other CEOs are those who either have no
experience at the time of turnover or are widely experienced in all divisions of the rms. For
13Including them doesnt change the primary results qualitatively. Further analysis on this subsample of
divesting CEOs will be conducted in Section 4.
14This include any relevant managerial skills that CEO accumulated in capacities with responsibility for
corporate operation in a specic industry. Parrino (1997) nds that industry-specic human capital is highly
valued in most industries.
15A similar characterization of specialist CEOs is also used in Xuan (2006). But the di¤erence is that
I focus on CEOs industry expertise in addition to the segment a¢ liation. For example, an insider CEO
advanced from and is only a¢ liated with segment A (using Xuan (2006)s terminology), one of the three
segments A, B and C in the rm. Before the CEO joined the rm and took the managerial responsibility in
segment A, she had also long managerial experience in the industry of segment B. Thus, in my sample, this
insider CEO is a¢ liated with and specialize in not only segment A but also B.
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those inexperienced, they either have always worked in a general role (like general counsel,
cheif nancial o¢ cer, VP of administration) within the rms, or they have been executives in
other rms that operate in di¤erent and unrelated industries16. For those widely experienced,
they have been incumbent CEOs serving a long tenure (more than ten years17) at the time
of divestitures. Many of them are founders of the rms.
2.2.2 Divest-for-better-match
I dene divisions in rms with specialist CEOs as specialized divisions if the specialist CEOs
have expertise in managing them, and the other divisions in the same rms are labeled unspe-
cialized divisions. I classify all divestitures made by specialist CEOs who divest unspecialized
divisions and retain specialized ones as divest-for-better-match18, as those divestitures result
in better match between CEOsexpertise and retained assets.
2.2.3 Firm Performance
Buy-and-hold Abnormal Return To investigate the value implication of rms divesti-
ture decision, I focus on the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns following the e¤ective
dates of divestitures. I measure the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return using a match-
ing rm methodology. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) both show
that the coventional tests for long-horizon abnormal stock returns using a reference portfolio,
such as a market index or industry and size based portfolio, su¤ered misspecication prob-
lem. Instead, along with Lyon et al. (1999), they demonstrate the control rm approach
16CEOs who were cited at the announcement of their appointments having specic skills like regulatory,
political, nancial, turnaround, etc. but out of industries that rmsdivisions operate in are also classied
as inexperienced in the industries.
17I set the ten-years criteria based upon literature on CEO turnover and longevity. For example, Song
(2006) documents that the mean and median of tenure for 679 CEOs recorded in ExecuComp between 1992
and 2004 are 10.4 and 7.8 years, respectively. Vancil (1997) reports that among Fortune 500 CEOs, only 25%
served for ten years or more.
18Cases when specialist CEOs divest both unspecialized and specialized divisions but retain specialized
divisions are also classied as divest-for-better-match when specialist CEOs specialize in more than one
division.
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yields well-specied statistics. Accordingly, in my study of three-year abnormal stock return
following rms refousing divestiture, I follow Datta et al. (2001) that each sample rm is
matched with a control rm by market capitalization (size), book-to-market ratio and one-
year prior stock return. In addition, I also require that no equity been publicly issued for
candidate control rms during the prior three-year period and they are not more than 10%
smaller than their matched sample rms. For both sample and control rms, the book-to-
market ratio is calculated at the end of the month immediately preceeding the e¤ective date
of the divestiture, and the market capitalization is as of the day prior to the e¤ective date.
One-year prior stock return is the one-year buy-and-hold return beginning 252 trading days
and ending on the last trading day prior to the e¤ective date.
Specically, I match each sample rm with its control rm such that the sum of the
absolute percentage di¤erences between the size, book-to-market ratio and pre-divestiture
one-year return of the sample rm and the control rm is minimized. Sample rms listed
on NYSE/AMEX are matched with their rst control rms from the pool of qualied
NYSE/AMEX - listed rms. If the rst control rm gets delisted during the holding pe-
riod, the next closest matched rm is substituted at the close of trading on the date of the
delisting, and so on. I use the same procedure to pick up control rms for Nasdaq-listed
sample rms from the pool of qualied Nasdaq-listed rms.
Excess Value As a second measure of rm performance, I examine rms change in di-
versication premium/discount (as measured by excess value developed in Berger and Ofek
(1995)) following divestiture. The excess value is the natural log of the ratio of a rms actual
value to its imputed value. The imputed value of a rm is calculated as the sales-weighted
sum of imputed values of its divisions as stand-alone entities. A positive excess value means
a diversication premium, while a negative one represents a diversication discount.
Return on Assets I also include rms return on assets as a third measure of rm perfor-
mance, which is the ratio of rms cash ow to the book value of total assets. Specically, I
look at the change in industry-adjusted ROA following divestiture. Industry-adjusted ROA
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is rms ROA net of the median ROA of all rms in the industry as classied using three-digit
SIC codes.
Announcement Cumulative Abnormal Return Finally, the cumulative abnormal re-
turns around divestiture announcement are studied using windows (-1, 0), (-1, 1), (-2, 0),
(-2, 2) and (-5, 5). They are computed using the market model and Scholes-Williams betas.
And the estimation period is from 220 days to 60 days prior to the announcement date.
2.3 Summary Statistics
I identify 164 specialist CEO-years, and among those, there are 159 divest-for-better-match
refocusing divestiture cases. Among the other 327 cases, 322 cases are divestitures by other
CEOs and 5 cases by specialist CEOs retaining only unspecialized divisions.
Table 1 presents the distribution by year of the full sample of 486 focus-increasing divesti-
tures as well as the divest-for-better-match and others subsamples. Divestitures, regardless of
whether for better match between CEOs talents and expertise and rm assets, dont appear
to be clustered in the sample period, even though are less frequent before 1982 and after
2001. Year xed e¤ects are included in the regressions to control for possible time e¤ects.
Table 2 provides rm-level characteristics of sample rms. Panel A reports rms nancial
conditions as of the year prior to divestiture. Firms divesting for better CEO-rm match are
generally larger, more diversied (both before and after divestiture), and more nancially
sound, while other rms are growing faster. It is less a surprise that rms with specialist
CEOs are usually larger and more diversied rms. Operating in a highly diversied port-
folio of industries, large conglomerates may nd it generally hard to have a CEO who has
acquired expertise in every single industry. Panel B reports the level of diversication prior to
and subsequent to divestiture for sample rms, and the change in focus around divestiture.
Firms divesting for better match are more diversied pre-divestiture and remain so post-
divestiture. Both types of rms on average experience signicant increase in focus following
divestitures. The median number of segments dropped due to divestitures is one for both
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types of rms. According to the diversication measure using sales-based Herndahl index,
rms other than divesting for better match even have experienced greater increase in focus
by 0.077 signicantly.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for both divested and retained segments. Firms tend
to divest smaller and lower-protability segments. Consistent with the divesting-for-better-
match hypothesis, unspecialized segments are dominantly divested, increasing the proportion
of specialized segments from less than 40% to nearly 50% for all rms divesting for better
match.
To examine the impact of divestiture proceeds on rms postdivestiture investment policy,
I follow Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) and look at rms change in leverage and in external
nancing after the divestiture (unreported). Generally I nd comparable results in Dittmar
and Shivdasani (2003), suggesting that divestitures do not have a long-term impact on rms
leverage and external nancing activities. More specically, divestitures do provide a large
cash ow for sample rms, on average about 33.9% (23.5% and 39% for rms divesting for
better match and other rms, respectively) of rms market value at year t-1. Both types
of rms experience reductions in leverage at year t and year t+1, and then increase their
leverage back to the level of year t-3 or even more. Both types of rms are net issuers
of capital (equity and debt issues net of equity repurchases and debt repayments) for the
predivestiture three years, become net distributors of capital at year t and year t+1, and
then are again net issuers at year t+2 and t+319.
3 Specialist CEOs Preference of Segment Divestiture
From Table 3, we have observed that unspecialized segments are dominantly divested. In this
section, I further test whether CEOs specialization has any incremental power in explaining
a segments divestiture, in addition to those well-documented factors in the literature. My
main hypothesis predicts that specialist CEO will more likely divest unspecialized segments
19Firms divesting for better match are net distributors of capital only at year t, and net issuers for all
postdivestiture three years.
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than specialized ones, ceteris paribus, for better match of her specialized expertise with
retained segments. I run the following logit regression on all segments in the sample:
Divestitureijt = +1Specialistjt+2SpecialistjtUnspecializedijt+Xijt+Y earFE+"ijt
(1)
In specication (1), Divestitureijt, Specialistjt and Unspecializedijt are all dummy vari-
ables. Divestitureijt equals one if a segment i is divested in rm j at time t. Specialistjt
takes value one if the divesting CEO is a specialist in rm j at time t. Unspecializedijt equals
one if the segment is not a specialized segment, i.e. the specialist CEO has no prior manage-
rial experience in that segment/industry. If ceteris paribus a specialist CEO divest for better
match between her talent and expertise and rms retained segments, one would predict that
2 > 0. Xijt contains a set of control variables that may a¤ect a segment being divested.
They include the segments size (segment assets), protability, growth opportunity (imputed
Tobins Q), industry protability (indutry ROA), segments asset tangibility and whether
a segment is a low-sale or lowest-sale segment. Segment imputed Q is the median Q of all
single-segment rms sharing the identical three-digit SIC code with the segment. Segment
protability is the ratio of segment operating prots to segment assets. Segment Industry
ROA is the median ROA of all single-segment rms sharing the identical three-digit SIC code
with the segment. Segment asset tangibility is the median of the ratios of net property, plant
and equipment to assets for all single-segment rms sharing the identical three-digit SIC code
with the segment. A low-sale segment is a dummy that equals one if the segments sales is
below the median of all segmentssales in the rm. A lowest-sales segment is a dummy that
equals one if the segments sales is smallest in the rm. Literature has documented that
rms more likely divest a small and less protable segment and segment with more liquid
assets (Schlingemann et al. (2002)). Similarly, when the segment asset is less rm-specic
and thus is more likely available for alternative use due to its higher tangibility, the segment
has higher chance of being divested (Boot (1992)). In all regressions, I include a calendar
year dummy for year xed e¤ects and use robust standard errors clustered by rm.
Results are reported in Table 4. An unspecialized segment is more likely divested by
specialist CEO even after controlling various factors that may a¤ect a segments divestiture.
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Despite the strong positive correlation between segment divestiture and unspecialization in
rms with specialist CEOs, it remains unclear whether specialist CEOsdivestiture decisions
are driven by the preference for better match of their expertise with rmsremaining seg-
ments, or alternatively, simply motivated by their desire for greater entrenchment (Shleifer
and Vishny (1989)). Given the contrasting value implications of these two divestiture motives
for shareholders, we will confront them against the rm performances and stock returns in
the next section.
Growth opportunity seem not a determining factor in rms divestiture choice of segment.
The impact of segments growth opportunity even has a positive sign, albeit not signicantly,
on rms divestiture decision. Divesting a high-growth segment is more likely when the
segment requires substantial investment relative to a low-growth segment with stable cash
ow. Earnings from the low-growth segment but with stable cash ow can be used to support
rms other growing businesses. Thus, despite the potential loss of long-term return on equity
coming across from divesting a high-growth segment, rm often needs to balance its short-
term cash needs with long-run equity return.
4 Postdivestiture Abnormal Stock Return
In this section, I provide and show the robustness of the primary result that specialist CEOs
divest for better match between their talents and rm assets. To do this, I mainly examine
the long-run buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns of refocusing divestitures, and confront
the primary result against other various hypotheses. To give a complete analysis, I also look




In Table 5, I report a univariate analysis of three-year buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns
(BHARs). Consistent with the literature, postdivestiture BHARs overall are signicantly
positive for the full sample of focus-increasing divestitures. The mean and median of postdi-
vestiture BHARs are 13.27% and 4.29%, respectively. However, all positive BHARs indeed
accrue to rms divesting for better match between CEOs talents and rms remaining assets.
Constrasting the nding by prior research, focus-increasing divestitures by other rms on av-
erage dont gain at all for the three years following divestitures. This conrms the conjecture
that specialist CEOs divestiture is more likely for better match of CEOs expertise with
rms assets instead of for greater entrenchment. Overall, the primary result suggests that
the better CEO-rm match following divestiture is more informative of the postdivestiture
long-run value creation than increase in focus itself.
4.1.2 Inside and Outside CEOs
Panel B of Table 5 examines whether the results are robust to CEOs rm-specic expertise.
I follow the standard practice in CEO turnover literature (e.g. Denis and Denis (1995) and
Parrino (1997)) and classify divesting CEOs as outsiders if their tenure with the rms at
the time of successions is no more than one year. In contrast with two decades ago, more
rms start to go outside for their new CEOs20. The recent literature (e.g. Murphy and
Zábojník (2004) and Frydman (2005)) proposes that there has been a shift in the importance
of skills from rm-specic to more general management expertise. In this setting of refocus-
ing divestiture, I take CEOs rm-specic experience into consideration as a test of whether
observable and unobservable rm-specic factors can account partly for the e¢ ciency varia-
tions of rmsdivestitures. In particular, given the fact that many external CEOs are also
industry outsiders for the rms, little evidence has been presented on whether cross-industry
outside hire works well in the context of corporate refocus, i.e., whether the leadership in one
20Li (2005) documents that 23.1% of 532 new CEOs from 1998 to 2001 are outsiders, while Denis and
Denis (1995) nd the proportion of outside hires is 15.3% in sample of 908 turnovers from 1985 to 1988.
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industry or rm travels well to another.
There are several points highlighted in Panel B. First, our main result holds that all
refocus value accrue to rms divesting for better CEO-rm match. Second, on average, rm-
specic experience is still valuable as inside CEOs outperform outside CEOs. Third, the role
of rm-specic experience becomes less signicant if external CEOs are industry insiders.
Instead the three-year BHAR is higher for rms with external specialist CEOs than those
with internal specialist CEOs. Nevertheless, external CEOs without industry experience
appears to underperform signicantly, which implies the leadership does not travels well
across industries and rms.
4.1.3 Diversied Parents and Stand-alone Parents
Based on the number of segments following divestiture at year t+1, I categorize divesting rms
into two groups: diversied parents which remain diversied21 and stand-alone parents which
operates a single segment This categorization is of particular interest, because according to
corporate focus hypothesis, divesting and becoming pure-play removes cross-subsidization
in rms investment, diverges from potential agency problem (Scharfstein and Stein (2000)
and Rajan et al. (2000)), and better aligns managerial incentives (Rotemberg and Saloner
(1994)), and hence will create more value than remaining diversied. Therefore, if the e¤ect
of corporate refocus is dominant, we should observe signicantly positive BHARs for those
stand-alone parents other than divesting for better match and they should at least outperform
those diversied parents divesting for better match.
The results presented in Panel C of Table 5 suggest that stand-alone parents other than
divesting for better match do not gain at all in the long run. On average, BHARs for those
rms are not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Rather, diversied parents divesting for better
match gain by an average 24.7% (median). The median of BHARs for stand-alond parents
divesting for better match is much higher at 53.6%. This contrasting result that only rms
realizing better CEO-rm match gain from becoming pure-play ex post indicates that focus
is not the only dimension in evaluating corporate refocus policy. In general, theres consistent
21Firms continue to operate at least two segments which share di¤erent three-digit SIC codes.
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rst-order evidence that all refocus gains accrue to rms divesting for better CEO-rmmatch,
and the e¤ect of becoming pure-play is at best second-order.
4.1.4 Reversal of Prior Mistakes
Divestitures, in some cases, are reversal of prior acquisition mistakes. Boot (1992) argues
that managers delay divestitures of acquisitions out of career concern that divestiture implies
admission of investment mistakes, thus announcement of divestitures should be good news
for shareholders. Literature has documented positive announcement stock return when rms
divest initially acquired segments (Weisbach (1995) and Allen et al. (1995)). Thus, the pos-
itive relation between divest-for-better-match and three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return
may be driven by the possibility that rms divesting for better match are mostly divesting
prior bad acquisitions.
To explore this issue, I track the acquisition records for every divested segment using
SDC and Lexis-Nexis wire reports, and nd divestitures of initially acquired segments in
106 rm-years. I nd the proportion of rms divesting for better match (23%) is not quite
di¤erent from the porportion of other rms (21%) within the subsample of those 106 cases.
Also, as panel D of Table 5 documents, the subsample of those 106 cases correcting prior
mistakes on average do not gain from divestitures in long run. Instead, the other subsample
of rm-years conducting regular divestitures experience signicantly positive BHARs (mean
14.39%, median 5.44%). In particular, the primary result that divestitures for better match
gain more holds regardless of whether divestitures are corrections of mistakes or not. The
mean (median) BHARs for rms divesting for better match are 43.63% (28.07%) and 46.97%
(28.68%), respectively, and are not signicantly di¤erent. Similarly, BHARs for other rms
are not signicantly di¤erent from zero, regardless of whether divestiture is a correction of
prior acquisition mistake or not.
4.2 Multivariate Analysis
To have a more complete view of the relationship between divestiture for better match and
sharehold returns, I conduct a multivariate analysis and several congurations of the following
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general model are estimated:
BHARs = f

Size;BM ratio; Prior runup;Divest-for-better-match; Insider
S tan d-alone;Reversal; Takeover; Change in focus

(2)
where the dependent variable BHARs is the natural logarithm of one plus the sample
rms three-year BHARs minus the natural logarithm of one plus the control rms three-year
BHARs. And Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalization as of the day prior to
the e¤ective date of divestiture. BM ratio is computed at the end of the month immediately
preceding the e¤ective date of divestiture, taken natural logarithm as well. Prior runup is
dened as the di¤erence of one-year buy-and-hold return beginning 252 days prior to the
e¤ective date of divestiture between the sample rm and control rm. Divest-for-better-
match, Insider, Stand-alone, Reversal and Takeover are all dummy variables. Divest-
for-better-match equals one if specialist CEO divests unspecialized segments and retains
specialized segments. Insider takes value one if the divesting CEO is promoted from inside
the rm. Stand-alone equals one if the divesting rm becomes single-segment rm at year
t+1. Reversal equals one if rm divests an initially acquired segment. Takeover equals one
if the divesting rm is taken over and get delisted within the three years following divestiture.
Change in focus is the change in sales-based Herndal index from year t-1 to t+1. In all
regressions, year dummies are included.
Results presented in Table 6 document that coe¢ cients for Divest-for-better-match are
positive and statistically signicant in the four models including it. These suggest that
divestitures resulting in better match between CEOs talents and retained assets gain signif-
icantly more than otherwise. The results are robust controlling for origins of CEOs to the
divesting rms, reservals of decisional mistakes by divesting prior acquisitions and postdi-
vestiture takeovers. Consistent with the univariate analysis, I nd the inuences of divesting
prior acquisitions and postdivestiture takeover activitity in divesting rms are not signicant.
A pairwise correlation test reveals that correlation ofDivest-for-better-match withChange
in focus and Stand-alone is signicantly negative, replicating the result shown in Panel B
of Table 2 that rms other than those divesting for better match experience greater increase
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in focus and also become more focused through divestitures. Regressions with Divest-for-
better-match (Model (5)) or without Divest-for-better-match (Model (2), (3) and (6)) all
nd that Change in focus and Stand-alone are not signicant determinants of gains from
refocusing divestitures. Coe¢ cients for change in focus are even, albeit insignicantly, nega-
tive. Firms vary in gains from refocusing divestitures. Shrinking business lines and getting
more focused do not necessarily lead to more value. This reinforces the main argument of
this study that it is not only focus but what one rm focuses on that matters.
4.3 Further Discussions
It is documented in the above analysis that rms divestiture gain is postively related with
the improvement in CEO-rm match quality. In this part, I provide evidences that lend
further support to the argument that divestiture that improves CEO-rm match creates
value. Specically, I investigate the cross-sectional variations of BHARs among rms that
divest for better CEO-rm match, and test whether greater improvement in CEO-rm match
through divestiture gives rise to bigger BHARs.
4.3.1 Firm Size and CEO-Firm Match Quality
A careful analysis of the sample rms nds that large conglomerate rms on average operate
in more industries than relatively smaller diversied rms. And thus for all rms divesting for
better match, divestiture of one segment in small rms should result in greater improvement
in CEO-rm match than in large rms. That is to say, the improvement in CEO-rm match
quality through divestiture is generally declining with rms size. Therefore we should expect,
among rms divesting for better match, bigger gains accrue to small rms than large ones.
Furthermore, this monotonicity between rm size and divestiture gain should NOT hold for
the other rms, as rm size is less relevant for divestiture gain for those rms.
The intuition for the relation between rm size and divestiture gain is two fold: First,
even though CEO-rm match improves, large rms usually continue operating in multiple
business lines, and in most cases there are still some of them that specialist CEOs do not
21
specialize in. In contrast, the majority or all assets retained are specialized ones in smaller
rms and thus more ideal match is realized in those rms. Therefore there should be greater
improvement in CEO-rm match in smaller rms. Second, in a large conglomerate with great
management depth, the inuence of CEOs specialization is less pronounced as in a small
rm. The governance hierarchy and management regularity may weaken the individual role
played by CEO. While CEO is critical in strategic decision in a large conglomerate as well as
in a small one, the hands-onexperience in specialized divisions may less likely be turned
to greater productivity in those divisions than in a small rm.
To conduct the test, I partition the full sample into quartiles based on the divesting rm
assets at year t-1. The results are presented in Table 7. Panel A shows that signicant
divestiture gains all accure to rms divesting for better match for all the four asset quartiles.
This veries the value of better CEO-rmmatch even among rms with similar sizes, negating
the possibility that rm size drives the primary result22. More interestingly, divestiture gains
decline monotonically from asset quartile 1 to quartile 4. This virtually reect the decrease
in change in match quality as rms become larger and more diversied. The monotonicity of
shareholder return with respect to rm size reinforces the primary argument that the increase
in CEO-rm matching quality is positively related with shareholder return from refocus. As
a comparison, this monotonicity pattern is not shown in the subsample of other rms. Other
rms in smallest and largest asset quartiles seem to gain more than those of middle sizes,
although BHARs in none of them are signicantly di¤erent from zero.
I repeat the regression analysis in Table 6 on each subsample by rm asset quartile.
Results obtained in Model (1) to (4) in Panel B of Table 7 reveal that the coe¢ cients for
Divest-for-better-match are signicantly positive for the lowest three asset quartiles, but
insignicant for the highest asset quartiles. Conrming the nding in the univariate analysis,
the magnitudes of coe¢ cients forDivest-for-better-match decline monotonically from lowest
to highest asset quartile. In addition, I also conduct an alternative test by including an
interaction term Assets  match in the full sample regression, where Assets is the natural
22There might be concern that large (more mature) rms gain more from refocus relative to small (growing)
ones, and thus the relationship between divestiture gains and divestiture for better match is spurious, simply
reecting the fact that rms categorized as divest-for-better-match are larger on average.
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logarithm of rm assets at year t-1 andmatch is the shortcut for the dummy variable Divest-
for-better-match:Coe¢ cient for this variable in Model (5) is signicantly negative as the
larger the rm is, the less is the improvement in match quality and thus the lower return is
from the divestiture. Consistent with the nding in the univariate analysis, divestiture gains
increase in the change in CEO-rm match quality.
4.3.2 Early Departure of Divesting CEOs
As discussed in Section 2, there are 70 rm-years where divestiture decision was made by
a CEO who steps down one year or months following the divestiture. Here I take a close
look at those cases. Among them, Im able to identify the reasons of the divesting CEOs
departures for 66 cases. In 18 rm-years, the divesting CEOs are ousted or resigned for poor
rm performances. In the other 48 rm-years, the divesting CEOs depart due to mandatory
retirement requirement, health problem or acceptance of a same position in another rm,
among which I classify 19 rm-years as Divest-for-better-match cases
These 19 cases with early departure of CEOs for exogenous reasons can potentially serve
as counter evidence to test the main hypothesis23. According to the main hypothesis that
rms gain from divestiture for better CEO-rmmatch, we would expect that divestiture gains
only accure to those rms with divesting CEOs staying for su¢ ciently long to capitalize on
the better talent-asset match, as documented in the above analysis. For those cases with
CEOs departing shortly following divestitures, smaller or no gains are expected for divesting
rms. A simple test nds that the mean (median) three-year BHARs for the 19 cases is -22%
(-16.6%), albeit statistically insignicant24. The contrasting di¤erence of divestiture gains
between better matched rms with CEOs staying for long term and CEOs departing shortly
following divestitures strengthens the main argument of this paper.
23I exclude from analysis those cases with divesting CEOs departing for more endogeneous reasons like
poor performance.
24The mean (median) BHAR is not signicantly di¤erent from zero either, when it is calculated only for
the period between the divestiture e¤ective date and CEOs departure date.
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4.4 Initial Announcement Cumulative Abnormal Return
To present a complete picture, in this section, I examine the initial announcement cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) for ve windows (-1, 0), (-1, 1), (-2, 0), (-2, 2) and (-5, 5). Typically,
theres a gap between initial announcement and the e¤ective date of divestiture, varying
from months to one or two years. Its worthwhile to note that the initial announcement CAR
measures slightly di¤erent value implications of divestiture from the three-year postdivestiture
BHAR. Although the announcement return is an immediate and market-based measure of
wealth e¤ect on divestiture and its expected future gain, it also reects the noise of stock
price reaction25, a¤ected by the degree of anticipation of the divestiture, the uncertainty
over the deal resolution (for instance, the completion of the buyers nancing arrangements),
the potential of overpayment by asset buyers and typically the deal size. Rather, the post-
e¤ective-date BHAR measures the pure gain from better management of retained assets after
the deal is resolved. Thus these two measurements of divestiture gain dont perfectly overlap,
and we need to interpret the results more carefully26.
The results on CAR of the sample rms, as shown in Table 8, are consistent with the
literature on divestiture announcement return. Investigation of all ve windows shows com-
parable results with those in prior studies. Both types of rms have signicantly positive
CARs around initial divestiture announcement. Nevertheless, the magnitudes of CARs for
rms divesting for better match are smaller, even though the di¤erences are basically not
statistically signicant. I interpret this pattern of announcement abnormal return as follows:
divestitures are good news for both types of rms, but investors have di¤erent anticipation
on the divestitures and also respond reasonably to the di¤erent deal sizes of divestitures by
those two types of rms. For rms divesting for better match, investors have observed the
specialist CEOsrelative strengths in managing di¤erent divisions and thus more likely well
anticipate specialist CEOsdivestiture decisions. Much less surprise may partially account
for the lower abnormal return. As for the deal size, investorsresponses are rather straight-
forward in that investors tend to respond more substantially to relatively bigger deals than
25See Bhagat et al. (2005) for a complete argument in their estimates of takeover value.
26In a similar line, Bates (2005) nds investment benets associated with asset sale proceeds are only
partially incorporated into share prices around the asset sale announcement.
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to smaller ones. A close look at the deal sizes nd that the mean (median) size (transaction
value of divestiture normalized by rms market value at year t-1) of deals by rms divesting
for better match is 0.24 (0.05). It is signicantly smaller than that by other rms, 0.39
(0.11). Collectively, the di¤ering degrees of anticipation and deal sizes may have driven the
announcement abnormal return pattern to some extent. Nevertheless, my focus in this study
is on how divestiture gain from better management of retained assets relates to CEOs skills.
5 Additional Tests and Robustness Check
In this section, I test the main hypothesis using two other proxies for rm performance:
diversication discount and return on assets. In addition, I also address the endogeneity
concern that CEOs are strategically selected to implement rms refocus plans made by
boards. Finally, other necessary robustness checks are also conducted in this section.
5.1 Diversication Discount
5.1.1 Univariate
As additional evidence, I examine the change in diversication discount for both types of
rms and expect that rms divesting for better match should experience more reduction
in diversication discount in the postdivestiture three-year period. I calculate the average
annual excess value (using sales multiplier) for three years prior to (year t-3 to year t-1) and
subsequent to divestitures (year t+1 to year t+3), and then look at the di¤erence between
predivestiture and postdivestiture average annual excess value. Following Berger and Ofek
(1995), I exclude the extreme excess values from the analysis, resulting in the loss of 43
observations (8.8%). Those dropped are with excess value either above 1.386 or below -1.386
(actual values either more than four times imputed values, or less than one-fourth imputed
values).
Table 9 shows that rms, regardless of whether divest for better match, are signicantly
discounted relative to a comparable portfolio of stand-alone rms for the three-year period
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prior to divestiture, and rms divesting for better match are even more discounted than
others. However, for the three-year period following divesitures, rms divesting for better
match are no loner discounted while other rms continue so. Both types of rms reduce
their diversication discounts from refocusing divestitures, but the analysis using di¤erence-
in-di¤erence approach reveals rms divesting for better match gain signicantly more than
other rms.
5.1.2 Multivariate
To show that my results are free from some confounding factors, I run rm-case xed e¤ect
regressions of excess value on rm characteristics for the three years prior to and subsequent
to divestitures. The regressions are based on the following model:
EVit = +1After+2Divest-for-better-matchAfter+Xit+Firm-CaseFE+Y earFE+"it
(3)
where EVit is the excess value for rm i at year t. After is a dummy that equals one
for postdivestiture period. The coe¢ cient 2 for the interaction term Divest-for-better-
match  After is of primary interest and is expected to be signicantly positive. I also
control for rms degree of focus using H-index and rm size using the natural logarithm of
rm assets.
The signicantly positive coe¢ cients for After as reported in Table 10 indicate that both
types of rms reduce their diversication discounts through refocus. But rms divesting for
better match gain signicantly more than other rms as we can tell from the signicantly
positive coe¢ cients for the interaction term Divest-for-better-match  After in all three
models. In sum, rms divesting for better CEO-rm match experience greater improvement
in market valuation than other rms, relative to a comparable portfolio of stand-alone rms.
5.2 Operating Performance
In this section, I also investigate the change in operating performance for both types of rm
from predivestiture to postdivestiture three-year period. I measure rms operating perfor-
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mance using industry-adjusted ROA. Since I need to run a rm-case xed e¤ect regression
on operating performance as in the examination of diversication discount in the last sec-
tion, its required data on ROA be available at least one year prior to and subsequent to
divestiture. Among the 31 observations dropped, 29 drops are due to unavailability of data
for post-divestiture period because rms get delisted within a year following the divestiture.
To address the concern that operating performance prior to divestiture may continue in the
period after divestiture, I estimate an AR(1) model regressing the postdivestiture industry-
adjusted three-year average ROA on the predivestiture industry-adjusted three-year average
ROA. The residual is the measure of the change in annual industry-adjusted ROA from pre-
divestiture period to postdivestiture period. I obtain comparable results if I simply use the
di¤erence in the industry-adjusted three-year average ROA.
Results in Table 11 show that both types of rms signicantly underform their industry
peers for the three years prior to divestitures. For the three years subsequent to divestiture,
rms divesting for better match dont underperform their industry peers while other rms
continue to do so. Also, rms divesting for better match achieve signicant improvement in
operating performance, but virtually no improvement is found in other rms. Taken together,
theres greater improvement in protability in rms divesting for better match than other
rms following the divestitures. This reinforce the primary argument that only focus on
assets that managers specialize in creates value. As a robustness check, I also estimate a
rm-case xed e¤ect regression similar to the one used for excess value and nd the main
results hold anyway (not reported).
5.3 Robustness
One potential concern is the endogeneity problem. CEO succession is not a random event.
Board may have determined corporate focus strategy and then specically select a specialist
CEO in anticipation that her expertise will faciliate to implement this focus strategy. To
address this issue, I perform an additional check. It is presumed with legitimacy that if CEOs
are strategically picked to implement boards predetermined decisions, we should observe
that the new specialist CEO divests the unspecialized divisions soon after the succession.
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Thus I repeat my analysis using the subsample of divesting rms in which CEOs undertake
divestitures at least two years after successions. This subsample consists of 352 rm-years,
about 72% of the full sample. Among the other 134 rm-years with time wedge between
succession and divestiture being less than two years, therere 71 rm-years divesting for
better match and 63 others. The results remain qualitatively similar for the 352 rm-years
subsample. Thus the alternative story unlikely provides full account for the main results
presented in this paper.
Another concern is that the change in segment reporting rule undertaken in 1997 by FASB
may inuence my results. The change in the denition of segments may make it di¢ cult to
compare segments before 1998 from after 1998. Thus I repeat all my analysis based on the
subsample of divestitures made before 1998, and obtain qualitatively similar results.
6 Conclusion
This paper relates rms divestiture decision and its value implication to CEOs skills. Using
a sample of 486 refocusing divestitures during the period 1980 to 2003, I nd that CEOs
more likely divest assets that they are less qualied to manage and focus on assets of better
match with their experience and expertise. And only when rmdivestiture achieves better
match between CEOs talents and rmremaining assets, does corporate refocus create value
in the long run. This study adds a new perspective to the "manager matters" literature by
showing how managers skills shape rm investment (divestiture) decision and its impact on
rm value. It also extends the literature on corporate focus by suggesting that ignoring the
match problem between manager and rm may overestimate the e¤ect of corporate focus.
The results in this paper also shed some light on rms CEO succession decision. In
recent two decades, more rms begin to search for talented outsiders, and typically industry
outsiders, as their helmsmen, the question is that whether the successful leadership in one
company or industry travels well to another. Typical cross-industry hire examples include
Geroge Fisher from Motoral to Kodak, John R. Walter from R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. to
AT&T, Louis V. Gerstner, Jr. from RJR Nabisco Inc to IBM, among many others. However,
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we have observed the limited success of these cross-industry hires for some of them. And this
casual observation is consistent with the main argument of this paper: otherwise-talented
managers may underperform when their talents do not get matched with rmsassets. Thus,
while there has been a general shift in the importance of skills from rm-specic to more
general managerial skills, this study suggests candidates industry experience and skills should
not be negligible factor in rms CEO succession decision.
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Table 1: Year-wise Distribution of Divestitures
This table reports the distribution by year of the full sample of 486 focus-increasing divestitures as well
as the divest-for-better-match (159 divestitures) and alll others (327 divestitures) subsamples. The divest-
for-better-match subsample consists of those rm-years that specialist CEOs divest unspecialized divisions








1980 2 2 1992 29 10 19
1981 2 2 1993 17 5 12
1982 14 5 9 1994 28 4 24
1983 18 4 14 1995 30 13 17
1984 33 12 21 1996 34 11 23
1985 27 11 16 1997 33 17 16
1986 34 14 20 1998 14 3 11
1987 33 8 25 1999 14 3 11
1988 22 7 15 2000 9 2 7
1989 21 9 12 2001 19 8 11
1990 30 5 25 2002 3 1 2
1991 19 7 12 2003 1 1
Total 486 159 327
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Table 2: Firm-level Summary Statistics
Panel A provides rm-level characteristics for the year prior to divestiture (year t-1). Tobins Q is as
of the begining of the year t-1. Asset growth is computed from year t-2 to year t-1. Means (medians) are
reported below.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Full sample Divest for better match All others











































Obs. 486 159 327
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Table 2: Firm-level Summary Statistics (continued)
Panel B reports the level of diversication prior and subsequent to divestiture, and change in focus
following divestiture. Two measures for focus are used: one is the number of reported segments and the other
is the sales-based Herndahl index. Means (medians) are reported below. ***, **, and * denote signicance
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Panel B: Change in Focus around Divestiture





















































Table 3: Segment-level Summary Statistics
This table reports segment-level summary statistics for the year prior to divestiture (year t-1). Imputed
Q, Industry ROA, Asset Tangibility are the medians of Tobins Q, ROA and the ratios of net property, plant
and equipment to total assets for all single-segment rms sharing the identical three-digit SIC code with the
segment, respectively. Means (Medians) are reported below.
Full sample Divest-for-better-match All others
All Divested Retained All Divested Retained






























































































Table 4: Specialist CEOs Preference of Segment Divestiture
This table shows the results from logit regressions of segment divestiture on CEOs specialization and
other segment characteristics for the year prior to the divestiture. Specialist is a dummy that equals one
if the divesting CEO has expertise and prior managerial experience in certain, but not all, divisions of the
rm. Unspecialized is a dummy for a division that equals one if a specialist CEO has no expertise or prior
managerial experience in that division. Segment imputed Q is the median Q of all single-segment rms
sharing the identical three-digit SIC code with the segment. Segment protability is the ratio of segment
operating prots to segment assets. Segment Industry ROA is the median ROA of all single-segment rms
sharing the identical three-digit SIC code with the segment. Segment asset tangibility is the median of the
ratios of net property, plant and equipment to assets for all single-segment rms sharing the identical three-
digit SIC code with the segment. A low-sale segment is dened as 1 if the segments sales is below the median
of all segmentssales in the rm. A lowest-sales segment is dened as 1 if the segments sales is smallest in
the rm. Robust standard errors (clustered by rm) are in parentheses. All regressions control for year xed
e¤ects. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Segment Divestiture Dummy









































































Obs. 1760 1352 1445 1445 1716 1430
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.065 0.063 0.105 0.087 0.120
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Table 5: Three-year Buy-and-hold Abnormal Stock Return
This table reports a univariate test of three-year buy-and-hold abnormal stock return (BHAR, unit: %).
Each sample rm-year is matched with a control rm, which is selected at the divestiture e¤ective date by
market capitalization, book-to-market ratio and prior one-year buy-and-hold stock return. Panel A shows the
full sample result of postdivestiture three-year BHARs. Panel B presents the results based on the division of
the sample into two subsamples: divestiture undertaken by CEOs advanced internally and by CEOs selected
from outside the rms. Panel C presents the results based on whether divesting rms remain diversied or
become stand-alone (single-segment rm) following divestiture. In Panel D, the sample is segmented based
on whether divestitures are reversals of prior acquisition mistakes or not. The last column of the table reports
the t-statistic and z-statistic for the di¤erence of BHARs between rms divesting for better match and other







Panel A: Full Sample
Mean 13.27 46.19  2.74 4.36
Median 4.29 28.07  5.18 5.06









Panel B: Postdivestiture BHARs by Origin of Divesting CEOs
B1: Inside CEOs
Mean 16.59 40.35 4.61 2.95
Median 5.94 24.99  1.86 3.76
Obs 364 122 242
B2: Outside CEOs
Mean 3.41 65.45  24.25 3.38
Median  3.84 48.58  16.66 3.44
Obs 122 37 85
Panel C: Postdivestiture BHARs by Parent rms at Year t+1
C1: Diversied Parents
Mean 9.84 36.84  6.17 3.65
Median 3.44 24.70  4.75 3.81
Obs 325 121 204
C2: Stand-alone Parents
Mean 20.18 75.97 2.95 2.84
Median 4.52 53.64  5.18 3.59
Obs 161 38 123
Panel D: BHARs by Correction of Prior Mistakes
D1: Divestiture of Prior Acquisitions
Mean 9.26 43.63  9.17 3.22
Median  0.91 28.07  6.84 3.07
Obs 106 37 69
D2: Other Divestitures
Mean 14.39 46.97  1.02 3.51
Median 5.44 28.68  3.39 4.11
Obs 380 122 25840
Table 6: Multivariate Analysis of Three-year Buy-and-hold Abnormal Stock Return
This table shows the results from regressions of three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return on divest-for-
better-match and other rm characteristics. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus
the sample rms three-year BHARs minus the natural logarithm of one plus the control rms three-year
BHARs. And Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalization as of the day prior to the e¤ective
date of divestiture. BM ratio is computed at the end of the month immediately preceding the e¤ective
date of divestiture, taken natural logarithm as well. Prior runup is dened as the di¤erence of one-year
buy-and-hold return beginning 252 days prior to the e¤ective date of divestiture between the sample rm
and control rm. Divest-for-better-match, Insider, Stand-alone, Reversal and Takeover are all
dummy variables. Divest-for-better-match equals one if specialist CEO divests unspecialized segments
and retains specialized segments. Insider takes value one if the divesting CEO is promoted from inside the
rm. Stand-alone equals one if the divesting rm becomes single-segment rm at year t+1. Reversal
equals one if rm divests an initially acquired segment. Takeover equals one if the divesting rm is taken
over and get delisted within the three years following divestiture. Change in focus is the change in sales-
based Herndal index from year t-1 to t+1. Robust standard errors (clustered by rm) are in parentheses.
All regressions include year dummy variables. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
levels, respectively.
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Regression Analysis on Three-year BHAR Using Full Sample
Dependent Variable: ln(1+BHARsample)-ln(1+BHARcontrol)





















































































Obs. 486 466 486 486 466 466
R2 0.110 0.079 0.076 0.114 0.116 0.083
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Table 7: Three-year Buy-and-hold Abnormal Stock Return by Asset Quartiles
This table reports three-year buy-and-hold abnormal stock return (BHAR, unit: %) by asset quartiles.
The sample is partitioned into quartiles based on the sample rmsassets. Each sample rm-year is matched
with a control rm, which is selected at the divestiture e¤ective date by market capitalization, book-to-market
ratio and prior one-year buy-and-hold stock return. Panel A reports the result of univariate analysis based on
asset quartiles with Quartile 1 being the lowest asset quartile and Quartile 4 the highest. The last column of
Panel A reports the t-statistic and z-statistic for the di¤erence of BHARs between rms divesting for better
match and other rms. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.







Asset Quartile 1 (Lowest)
Mean 33.41 103.20 15.42 2.45
Median 22.71 74.30 8.78 2.88
Obs 122 25 97
Asset Quartile 2
Mean 3.28 57.60  14.63 2.81
Median  4.30 52.39  16.76 3.09
Obs 121 30 91
Asset Quartile 3
Mean 4.25 32.32  12.96 2.89
Median  0.73 34.45  8.42 3.08
Obs 121 46 75
Asset Quartile 4 (Highest)
Mean 11.98 26.73  1.39 2.07
Median 1.09 10.51  1.25 1.94
Obs 122 58 64
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Table 7: Three-year Buy-and-hold Abnormal Stock Return by Asset Quartiles
(Continued)
Panel B reports the result based on a multivariate model, estimated for each of the sample rm asset
quartiles (Model 1 to 4) and the full sample (Model 5). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm
of one plus the sample rms three-year BHARs minus the natural logarithm of one plus the control rms
three-year BHARs. And Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalization as of the day prior to the
e¤ective date of divestiture. BM ratio is computed at the end of the month immediately preceding the
e¤ective date of divestiture, taken natural logarithm as well. Prior runup is dened as the di¤erence of
one-year buy-and-hold return beginning 252 days prior to the e¤ective date of divestiture between the sample
rm and control rm. Divest-for-better-match, Insider, Stand-alone, Reversal and Takeover
are all dummy variables. Divest-for-better-match equals one if specialist CEO divests unspecialized
segments and retains specialized segments. Insider takes value one if the divesting CEO is promoted from
inside the rm. Reversal equals one if rm divests an initially acquired segment. Takeover equals one
if the divesting rm is taken over and get delisted within the three years following divestiture. Change in
focus is the change in sales-based Herndal index from year t-1 to t+1. Assets match is an interaction
variable, where Assets is the natural logarithm of rm assets at year t-1 andmatch is the shortcut for the
dummy variableDivest-for-better-match: Robust standard errors (clustered by rm) are in parentheses.
All regressions include year dummy variables. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
levels, respectively.
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Asset * match  0.122
(0.055)


















































Obs. 116 118 115 117 466
R2 0.278 0.332 0.276 0.274 0.127
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Table 8: Initial Annoucement Cumulative Abnormal Return
This table documents the initial annoucement cumulative abnormal return (CAR) using ve windows.
They are computed using the market model and Scholes-Williams betas. And the estimation period is from









Mean 1.77 0.98 2.15  1.17
Median 0.86 0.64 1.01  0.37
Window (-1, 1)
Mean 2.17 1.94 2.28  0.34
Median 0.96 0.98 0.92 0.06
Window (-2, 0)
Mean 1.82 0.74 2.35  1.61
Median 0.62 0.24 0.77  0.53
Window (-2, 2)
Mean 2.21 1.62 2.49  0.87
Median 1.38 1.24 1.43  0.19
Window (-5, 5)
Mean 2.22 1.59 2.52  0.93
Median 1.56 1.33 1.70  0.37
Obs 486 159 327
46
Table 9: Diversication Discount
This table shows the result of univariate test on diversication discount. Annual excess value from year
-3 to -1 and from yr 1 to 3 are average annual excess values (using sales multiplier) for the predivestiture and
postdivestiture three-year period, respectively. The change in annual excess value is the di¤erence between
predivestiture and postdivestiture values. Following Berger and Ofek (1995), the extreme excess values are
removed from the analysis, resulting in the loss of 43 observations (8.8%). Those dropped are with excess
value either above 1.386 or below -1.386 (actual values either more than four times imputed, or less than







Annual excess value from yr -3 to -1
Mean  0.104  0.167  0.072  0.095
Median  0.133  0.186  0.081  0.105
Obs 390 134 256
Annual excess value from yr 1 to 3
Mean  0.028 0.013  0.049 0.074
Median  0.047  0.011  0.048 0.049
Obs 375 130 245
Change in annual excess value from yr (-3, -1) to yr (1, 3)
Mean 0.092 0.154 0.058 0.107
Median 0.107 0.124 0.086 0.048
Obs 333 118 215
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Table 10: Multivariate Analysis of Diversication Discount
This table shows the results from rm-case xed e¤ect regressions of excess value on rm characteristics
for the three years prior to and subsequent to divestitures. "After" is a dummy variable that equals one if
the observations occur after the divestiture and is zero otherwise. Divest-for-better-match is a dummy that
equals one if specialist CEOs divest unspecialized divisions and retain specialized divisions. H-index is the
sales-based Herndahl index measuring the degree of focus. Robust standard errors (clustered by rm-case)
are in parentheses. All regressions also include year dummy variables. ***, **, and * denote signicance at
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.


























Obs. 2014 2014 2014
Number of rm-cases 431 431 431
Firm-case xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes
R2 (within) 0.056 0.065 0.073
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Table 11: Operating Performance (Industry-adjusted ROA)
Annual ROA from year -3 to -1 and from year 1 to 3 are the three-year average industry-adjusted ROA
for predivestiture and postdivestiture, respectively. I estimate an AR(1) model, regressing the postdivestiture
three-year average industry-adjusted ROA on the predivestiture three-year average industry-adjusted ROA.
The residual is the measure of the change in annual industry-adjusted ROA from predivestiture three-year
period to postdivestiture three-year period. I obtain comparable results if I simply use the di¤erence in the







Annual ROA from year -3 to -1
Mean  0.018  0.012  0.021 0.009
Median  0.010  0.009  0.010 0.001
Obs 455 152 303
Annual ROA from year 1 to 3
Mean  0.016  0.002  0.023 0.021
Median  0.011 0.002  0.017 0.015
Obs 455 152 303
Change in annual ROA from year (-3, -1) to year (1, 3)
Mean 0.000 0.010  0.005 0.015
Median 0.003 0.009  0.000 0.009
Obs 455 152 303
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